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NOTE AND COMMENT
REQUISITES FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION IN MONTANA
On February 17, 1949, the Supreme Court of Montana de-
cided the case of Laas v. All Persons Claiming Any Interest In,,
or Lien Upon Real Property Herein Described et al.' The Laas
case was a suit to quiet title. A patent to the land involved in
this case was issued by the government of the United States on
April 5, 1918, to the heirs of Katie Robowoitra, and the defend-
ants as such heirs claim title to the property. The plaintiff
Lizzie Laas claimed title to said land under a tax deed to Nick
Laas, plaintiff's husband, dated December 19, 1922. The plain-
tiff also asserted a claim to said land by adverse possession.
In the case the Justice said:
". .. it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish the
following facts in order to claim adverse possession: viz:
(b) An entry into the possession of the property under
claim of title founding such claim upon a recorded instru-
ment as being a conveyance of the property in question,
and that there has been a continued occupation and pos-
session of the property included in such instrument for 10
years; ...
This statement will leave one reading the case in doubt as to
some rules of law previously considered well settled in Montana
The questions raised by this statement concern the necessity of
a written instrument when claiming title by adverse possession,
and the necessity of recording such instruments.
The Montana Supreme Court in many decisions has stated
the elements which are necessary to constitute title by adverse
possession. The Montana court has repeatedly said:
". .. Possession for the statutory period under color or
claim of title, which possession is actual, visible, exclusive,
hostile, open and notorious, or a possession of such a char-
acter as to raise a presumption of notice, and so patent
that the owner could not be deceived, and so brought home
to the owner as to enable the latter to institute an action
for possession during the running of the statute of limita-
tions, will vest title by perscription in the occupant.. ..
'(1948) ...... Mont ........ 189 P.(2d) 670.
2Supra note 1.
8LeVasseur V. Roullman (1933) 93 Mont. 552, 20 P.(2d) 250; Morrison
v. Linn (1915) 50 Mont. 396, 147 P. 166; Newton v. Weiler (1930) 87
Mont. 164, 286 P. 133; Blackfoot Land Development Co. v. Murks
(1921) 60 Mont. 544, 199 P. 685; Ferguson v. Standley (1931) 89 Mont.
489, 300 P. 245.
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The Montana Court, in saying possession for the statutory period,
etc., under color or claim of title, clearly recognizes that posses-
sion under either may ripen into title. These terms, color of
title and claim of title are very important, and to establish their
relationship to the problems involved in this comment it is neces-
sary to show the development of the doctrines.
Claim or Title. Claim of title, or claim of right, when used
in connection with adverse possession may be defined as the use
of property as one's own to the exclusion of the rights of all
other persons irrespective of any written instrument, or legal
title upon which the claim is founded. There need be no written
instrument or semblance of title to hold under claim of title.
The party holding property under claim of title need not have
any claim, and, in fact may be a trespasser. In a leading Mon-
tana case, Morrison v. Linn, the Court said:
". .. Claim of title, in the law of adverse possession, is
nothing more than the claim asserted by a disseisor of his
intention to appropriate and use the land as his own, to
the exclusion of the rights of all other persons, and irre-
spective of any semblance of color, right, or title as the
foundation of his claim, viz: A naked trespass may initi-
ate the claim of an adverse occupant to title by adverse
possession; there being no necessity that his entry into
possession be made under pretense of right or title. . .. '
The other Montana cases on this subject are in full accord."
As noted supra, under claim of title as well as under color
of title, it is necessary for a person claiming by adverse posses-
sion to have had actual, visible, etc., possession for the statutory
period. The possession which is required is actual possession of
the property. Montana has provided, in R.C.M. 1947, Section
93-2511 (9022), what possession will be deemed to constitute
actual possession when holding property under claim of title.
R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2511 (9022). "What constitues
adverse possession under claim of title not written. For
the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a
person claiming title, not founded upon a written instru-
ment, judgment, or decree, land is deemed to have been
possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial in-
closure;
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved."
'(1915) 50 Mont. 396, 147 P. 166.
5Ferguson v. Standley (1931) 89 Mont. 489, 300 P. 245.
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In R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2510 (9021), a limitation is put on
what may be claimed by adverse possession. The code provision
declares:
"Premises actually occupied under the claim of title
deemed to be held adversely. Where it appears that there
has been an actual continued occupation of land, under
a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not
founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree,
the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to
have been held adversely."
From these statutes and many cases' it is clear that Montana
recognizes that a party holding under claim of title not written
may get title by adverse possession. R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-
2511 (9022) gives the guide as to what constitutes possession,
and R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2510 (9021) indicates that adverse
possession under claim of title will ripen into title only to that
property which is actually occupied or possessed.
Color of title. Color of title when used in connection with
adverse possession may be defined as a writing that purports to
give good title to realty, but which does not do so. In Wright v.
Mattison' the Supreme Court of the United States said:
".. . The courts have concurred, it is believed, without
exception in defining 'color of title' to be that which in
appearance is title, but which in reality is no title. .... "
The Montana cases8 are fully in accord with this statement in
Wright v. Mattison.
Color of title in adverse possession was an innovation of the
American law which was unknown at the earlier common law.-
The doctrine of color of title in adverse possession came about
because of necessity, and the reason for its development explains
its purpose. During the early expansion in our country, land
was sold in large tracts and due to the unsettled conditions, etc.,
much of it was sold several times over. This resulted in great
confusion of land titles. Mlany innocent parties had seemingly
'Scott v. Jardine Gold Mining and Milling Co. (1927) 79 Mont. 485, 257
P. 406; Blackfoot Land Development Co. v. Burks (1921) 60 Mont.
544, 199 P. 485.
7(1855) 59 S.Ct. 280, 15 L.Ed. 280, 18 How. 50.
8Fitschen Bros. Commercial Co. v. Noye's Estate (1926) 76 Mont. 175,
246 P. 773; Ferguson v. Standley (1931) 89 Mont. 489, 300 P. 245;
Morrison v. Linn (1915) 50 Mont. 396, 147 P. 166; Sullivan v. Neel
(1937) 105 Mont. 253, 73 P.(2d) 206.
'Phipps, Adverse posse8sion--Color of title-Origin of doctrine, 18 ORE.
L. REv. 188 (1932).
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valid paper titles which were of no value, and held such large
tracts that it was impossible to possess the whole tract. With
this situation, under rules of adverse possession of the time, it
was impossible for many to get title because adverse possession
required possession of all property claimed. Because of this the
courts and legislators sought a way to secure the party in posses-
sion under an invalid title what was due him, and so the doctrine
of color of title arose.'
Under color of title one who entered upon land was pre-
sumed to have entered in accordance with the instrument and
his actual possession of a portion of the property would, by pre-
sumption of law, constructively extend his possession to the
boundary defined in the instrument. In other words, a man who
has possession of a part of a tract and who holds under color of
title, has constructive possession of the entire tract.
R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2508 (9019) provides when occupa-
tion under a written instrument will be deemed adverse:
"Occupation under a written instrument or judgment-
when deemed adverse. When it appears that the occupant,
or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession
of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other
right, founding such. claim upon a written instrument, or
judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a
continued occupation and possession of the property in-
cluded in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some
part of the property, under such claim, for ten years, the
property so included is deemed to have been held ad-
versely. "
This Montana statute clearly indicates by the words, or of some
part of the property, that all of the property included within
an instrument may be held adversely by possession of a part.
The Montana decisions are in accord.u
In R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2509 (9020) we find what pos-
session is necessary to constitute actual possession when claiming
under color of title:
"What constitutes adverse possession under written in-
strument or judgment. For the purpose of constituting
an adverse possession by any person claiming a title
founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or de-
cree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied
in the following cases:
mO~upra note 9.
uFitschen Bros. Commercial Co. v. Noye's Estate (1926) 76 Mont. 175,
246 P. 773; Morrison v. Linn (1915) 50 Mont. 396, 147 P. 166.
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1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial en-
closure.
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, either for the
purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the
ordinary use of the occupant.
4. Where a known farm or lot that has been partly im-
proved, the portion of such farm or lot that has been
left not cleared or not inclosed, according to the usual
course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be
deemed to have been occupied for the same length of
time as the part improved and cultivated."
Under this statute, which applies when one claims under color of
title, the acts which will constitute actual possession are not as
limited as those acts necessary when holding under claim of
title.'
As can be seen by R.C.M. 1947, Sections 93-2508 (9019),
93-2509 (9020), 93-2510 (9021), 93-2511 (9022), above, and the
decisions under those statutes," the basic differences between
holding property under color of title, and holding under claim
of title not written, is that possession of land with color may
ripen into title, not only to the land actually occupied, but to
all the land described in the muniment, while possession under
mere claim of title may ripen into title only to the land actually
occupied; also, the acts which will constitute adverse possession
when holding under color of title are not as limited as when
holding under claim of title not written.
Whether a claimant attempts to gain title with, or without
color of title, the essential requirements of an adverse possession '
remain the same. The writer could find no case in Montana
where color of title added or detracted from the ordinary rules
of adverse possession, except, as provided by statute, under color
of title there may be constructive possession by actual possession
of a part, and, when holding under color of title the acts which
will constitute actual possession are not as limited as when hold-
ing without color. Color of title does not change the require-
ment of actual possession of the property, but merely modifies
that requirement.
Claim of title is always a requirement of adverse possession,
"Supra note 4.
"Supra notes 4 and 11.
"Supra note 3.
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and must be established whether the claimant holds under color
of title or not. In the Montana case of Fitschen Bros. Com. Co.
v. Noyes Estate' the Court said:
".. . Color of title, without claim is of little effect. Claim
of title, without color, may ripen into title only to the land
actually occupied, while with it (color), it may ripen into
title not only to the land actually occupied but to all de-
scribed in the color of title, if that actually occupied be a
part thereof. viz: Claim of title is of course essential to
impart to possession the element of hostility. Where land
is claimed adversely, color of title, except where required
by statute, is not required..."
The Fitschen case clearly indicates that claim of title is an es-
sential in any claim' of adverse possession in Montana, and that
color is never required except by statute.
The only affect color of title has had on the ordinary rules
of adverse possession is to modify them at two points; that is,
it allows a broader basis for actual possession, and allows con-
structive possession by possession of a part. From this it seems
logical that color of title is absolutely necessary to constitute
adverse possession only: when the claimant has not been in
actual possession of the whole tract, or when his possession is
not sufficient to constitute actual possession under mere claim
of title, but is sufficient under, color of title.
Color of title may always be used as a basis for adverse
possession, but it is not necessary except as noted. If a claimant
has color of title he will be on safer ground if he claims adverse
possession thereunder. Color of title is always good evidence of
the intent necessary for claim of title, the hostility, notoriety, or
notice to the owner, etc., but color of title is not absolutely re-
quired except as noted supra.
The Justice in the Laas case said that it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to establish an entry into possession under
claim of title, founding such claim upon a written instrument,
etc. This amounts to the same thing as saying that the plain-
tiff must establish an entry into possession under color of title.'
After a survey of the doctrine of color of title in adverse pos-
session, it is evident that this statement by the Justice is not en-
tirely correct for the facts of the Laas case.
The facts in the case constituting possession1' clearly show
15(1926) 76 Mont. 175, 246 P. 773.
OSupra notes 7 and 8.
"(Summary of facts constituting plaintiff's adverse possession.) The
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acts sufficient for actual possession of the entire tract claimed,
as is required when entry is made under claim of title not writ-
ten.' As previously noted, the elements which must be proved
are the same in any adverse possession action. There must al-
ways be an adverse possession, and the only time color of title
is needed is when required by statute. By the facts of the case
the plaintiff, Lizzie Laas, established beyond a doubt, an actual
possession of the entire tract, and a possession sufficient to con-
stitute actual possession whether she held under color of title,
or claim of title without color. It is therefore not necessary to
show entry under color of title because the reasons for requiring
a showing of color are not present.
The statement that Lizzie Laas must found her claim upon
a written instrument, was made by the Court without qualifica-
tion, explanation, or exception, while in fact there were suf-
ficient grounds for adverse possession whether or not there was
a written instrument, or color of title, under which the plaintiff
entered into possession.
For these reasons the writer feels that the statement in the
case, requiring entry under a written instrument, is at least
doubtful, and worthy of comment.
Another question arises in the case from the requirement
that the instrument under which the plaintiff claimed must have
been recorded." The writer can find no basis for such a require-
ment. In Montana there are no decisions or statutes, which say
anything about recording such instruments before they may be
used -as a basis for founding a claim in adverse possession.
The rule as stated in American Jurisprudence is:
". .. In the absence of statutory authority to the con-
trary, an instrument relied on as color of title need not
be recorded.. So, the failure to record a sheriff's receipt
for the amount bid at a tax sale, although such receipt is
required by statute to be recorded, does not affect the ef-
ficacy of the tax deeds as color of title, even though it may
affect its validity as a conveyance ..
plaintiff and her predecessors in interest, from December of 1922 until
the commencement of the suit to quiet title in 1943, have been In open
and notorious possession of the property claiming at all times to be the
legal owners. They built and maintained fences, reservoirs, and out-
buildings. The property was used for pasture, and was cultivated.
The plaintiff and her predecessors paid all taxes levied against the
property, and exercised other acts of ownership including the execution
of contracts and oil and gas leases.
"R.C.M. 1947 §§93-2510 (9021), 93-2511 (9022) Supra p. 89, 90.
"Supra note 2.
"AM. JUR., Adverse Possession §204.
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This rule is the great weight of authority in the American juris-
dictions. In a small minority of jurisdictions it is specifically
provided by statute that color of title must be recorded to be
effective in adverse possession.
Whether a claimant holds under color of title, or claim of
title without color, there must be an adverse possession. There
must still be an actual, visible, exclusive, hostile, open and notori-
ous possession of such a character as to raise a presumption of
notice, and so brought home to the owner as to enable the latter
to institute an action for possession during the running of the
statute of limitations. Though a recording may prove very use-
ful in evidence to establish these requirements, the recording
adds nothing that is not already required.
The American common law does not require the color of
title be recorded before it may be used in adverse possession,
and until it is specifically required, there is no basis for assum-
ing that color of title must be recorded in Montana.
DONALD OLSSON.
'2 C.J. Adverse Possession § §348, 349, 350.
2Supra note 22.
THE CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Trusts, from an early time, have been administered ex-
clusively as a part of equity jurisprudence. They are classi-
fied in two general categories-private trusts and charitable
trusts. Closely related to, and treated in most classifications
with, charitable trusts are unconditional gifts to charitable
corporations and gifts to charitable corporations for specific
purposes. Gifts to unincorporated charitable associations are
also included under the general heading of charitable trusts.
Chancery courts in England enforced charitable trusts be-
fore 1601 as a part of their inherent jurisdiction of equitable
suits. Due to neglect in their enforcement, the Statute of
Charitable Uses was passed in that year.' This statute pro-
vided new methods for the enforcement of charities and also
named some of the more common charities of the day.
An early U.S. Supreme Court case had much to do with
the development of the doctrine in this country. This case was
143 Emz. e. 4.
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